Blowback: Investor-State Dispute Mechanisms in International Trade Agreements
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into force on 1 January 1994 gave unprecedented rights to private investors. Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 1 the American, Canadian, and Mexican governments assumed a wide-ranging set of obligations to investors from the other NAFTA countries. Investors were granted national treatment, and were protected from direct or indirect expropriation of their investments. Importantly, when investors from one NAFTA country believed they had been treated unfairly by one of the other two signatory governments, they were not limited to seeking redress in the courts of that country. Rather, they were given the right to bring a claim for compensation against that government in an international tribunal (Alvarez; Dawson; Gaines; Gantz; NAFTA Secretariat; Soloway 2002; Tollefson; Weiler 2000 Weiler , 2001a .
While provisions for investor-state arbitration were a common feature of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS), NAFTA Chapter 11 represented a radical change in existing practices, in at least two major respects. First, NAFTA was the first international investment and trade agreement to provide for investor-state arbitration between developed countries. Second, unlike BITS, which allowed only governments to seek arbitral relief on behalf of their nationals, NAFTA granted private investors the right to take a complaint against a government directly to binding international arbitration.
These new provisions generated considerable controversy, raising community fears and anger about the consequences of these new forms of corporate rights. In addition, critics argued that Chapter 11 was poorly drafted, thus leading to unintended interpretations and rulings; that the arbitration processes lacked transparency and accountability; and that it would lead to 'regulatory chill' where governments would be reluctant to legislate in areas such as environmental protection for fear of future litigation.
Nonetheless, the use of NAFTA-style investor rights provisions were quickly The purpose of this article is to explain this radical departure from the trend over the 1990s to entrench stiff investor-state disciplines in bilateral and multilateral trade treaties. We suggest that the abandonment of NAFTA-style Chapter 11 disciplines in the Australia-U.S. free trade agreement is best explained by a phenomenon usually associated with American security and intelligence policy-'blowback.' Originally used to describe the backward escape of unburned gunpowder when a pistol is fired, 
NAFTA's Chapter 11
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement had as its primary purpose the encouragement of cross-border investment, and it was designed to deal with the particularities of the politics of foreign investment in North America. However, the Law (UNCITRAL). Chapter 11 also provided that the awards of these international arbitration tribunals were enforceable in domestic courts.
But the drafters of Chapter 11 took an important further step. Unlike most BITs, which required that a government submit a dispute to arbitration on behalf of an investor, Chapter 11 permits all investors to launch claims unilaterally. As Michael J.
Trebilcock and Robert Howse note (355), NAFTA was 'the first comprehensive international trade treaty to provide private parties direct access to dispute settlement as of right'.
Thus, while NAFTA's Chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism, mirroring as it did the mechanism of most BITs, was not unusual, the way in which aggrieved investors could move to arbitration represented a radical change. No longer did claims for redress have to be filed in the courts of the country where the alleged harm occurred; no longer did an aggrieved corporation have to depend on the willingness of a national state to sign on to a grievance, as under a standard BIT. Instead, corporations could simply move directly to demand arbitration.
It did not take corporate lawyers long to spot the huge opportunity afforded by this change. Trade Monitor), it should be noted that the company never followed through and submitted a valid claim; there is in fact no Chapter 11 arbitration currently underway.
These early exercises of the investor-rights provisions of NAFTA generated considerable opposition from those who feared that granting such rights to corporations would produce negative reactions. Some complaints about Chapter 11 focused on the ways in which it was interpreted, 14 and the demonstration effect of these interpretations, which in essence woke up investors to the full gamut of investment treaties available for them to press their claims (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2003, 14) .
Another concern relates to 'regulatory chill'; that is, because investors can lodge claims against any level of government, all governments-at the national, state/provincial and local levels-might be reluctant to legislate in areas such as environmental protection and public health, for fear of future litigation.
A third complaint has been that NAFTA's Chapter 11 suffers from a democratic deficit (Atik; International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2001; Public Citizen).
Opportunities for public input were limited, especially in Canada and Mexico which did not have well-developed institutional mechanisms for community consultations in trade negotiations. The Chapter 11 dispute process is initiated by an investor and is conducted by a three-person tribunal. The NAFTA parties have no joint control over the composition of the tribunals. Instead, in each dispute, the investor and the state each nominate their own arbitrator, with the third meant to be neutral. Concerns were expressed about the lack of accountability in the selection of tribunal members, and the lack of safeguards that are associated with domestic court systems, including public access to hearings and appeals mechanisms (Soloway 2003) . In the 1990s, tribunal hearings were held in camera and third parties were not able to participate in any way.
Moreover, there was considerable resistance to bringing greater transparency to these arbitral processes, for fear that they would become 'politicized' (Canada).
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Finally, a persistent criticism has been that NAFTA's Chapter 11 lacks legitimacy.
As Charles Brouwer has argued, unless international legal regimes operate with predictability and coherence, conform to some historical practice, and incorporate shared values of the community, they are likely to founder. In his estimation, Chapter 11 fails on all three counts. Its lack of clarity is complicated by its institutional design:
'to resolve problems of textual indeterminacy, Chapter 11 supplies an arbitral process that generates incoherent rulings on a key provision, lacks an accepted pedigree … and evidently fails to incorporate the fundamental values of the governed community'
(Brouwer, 59).
In short, by the end of the 1990s, In the final round of negotiations in Washington in January 2004, the U.S.
continued to press hard for the inclusion of investor-state dispute provisions. Australia expressed its equally strong opposition, on the grounds that their inclusion would be 'unacceptable' (confidential interview 2004). Ultimately, however, the U.S. backed down, and agreed to the Australian proposal that the legal systems in both countries were 'robust' enough to ensure that investors should find sufficient protection through domestic courts. The result was that a NAFTA-style Chapter 11 was abandoned.
Instead, the Chapter 11 in AUSFTA, while it imposed certain obligations on both governments, did not give investors the right to arbitrate disputes with governments directly.
As If a Party considers that there has been a change in circumstances affecting the settlement of disputes on matters within the scope of this Chapter and that, in light of such change, the Parties should consider allowing an investor of a Party to submit to arbitration with the other Party a claim regarding a matter within the scope of this Chapter, the Party may request consultations with the other Party on the subject, including the development of procedures that may be appropriate. Upon such a request, the Parties shall promptly enter into consultations with a view towards allowing such a claim and establishing such procedures.
As will be evident, this article marks several important departures from NAFTA.
First, it ensures that investors are not the drivers of investment disputes. Instead, an aggrieved investor who has exhausted redress in the domestic courts of the other country must convince its own government to take up the cudgels on its behalf to proceed further, for only a 'Party'-one of the governments-has the capacity to request a move to arbitration. In recognition of the unique circumstances of this Agreement-including, for example, the long-standing economic ties between the United States and Australia, their shared legal traditions, and the confidence of their investors in operating in each others' markets-the two countries agreed not to adopt procedures in this FTA that would allow investors to arbitrate disputes with governments. This issue will be revisited if circumstances change.
Given that these 'circumstances' were highly unlikely to change, this wording dramatically limits the scope and range of the conditions under which it is likely that one of the governments will seek arbitration. Moreover, the heightened publicity being given to the cases brought against the United States also threatened to have political/electoral effects. As William Greider of
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The Nation put it (Public Broadcasting System), it was likely that Americans will be shocked and quite confused, if any of a number of cases, whether it's Methanex or Loewen, or some of the others, manage to win damages against the United States. People at first are gonna say, 'Huh? What is that about?' And then, as it's explained to them, they're gonna say, 'We didn't sign on for that. That's not what we think about as a global trade agreement.' And then the education process is quickly gonna turn into anger, I believe.
While Zoellick himself was clearly not prepared to openly admit that NAFTA's
Chapter 11 I don't find it altogether surprising that there have been creative uses of the [Chapter 11] mechanism because, I mean, I'm a lawyer and our profession is creative. People use worse words for U.S., but they are at least creative. And that can result in, you know, attempting to make a use of a provision that perhaps was not in the contemplation of the drafters.
However, Roh left in little doubt that he believed that a mistake in drafting had been made:
If you took that wording literally and said, okay, let's make it clear or let's add a rule that says, by the way, expropriation means anything that diminishes the value of your investment, then it seems to me that that's probably -I, who am a huge supporter still of these agreements, would say that's a -that's a big mistake because you get -if you try to push it to there, the people are not going to go with you, because that's just too greedy.
Given the increasing expression of concerns from across the United States, it is perhaps not surprising that many agencies in the U. Ahdieh, 211) . Moreover, the opposition was coalescing on the eve of an election year and on an issue that could not easily be sold to the public.
Conclusion
The abandonment of investor-state provisions in Chapter 11 of the Australia-U.S. Free In the event, the U.S. side was willing to accede to an Australian demand to remove investor-state provisions from the AUSFTA draft. Such a 'concession' served two purposes: not only did it remove a potential irritant that might have posed an obstacle to the passage of the AUSFTA in the Australian Senate, where the opposition parties were in the majority, but it also removed a potential irritant in American politics, not an inconsiderable factor in an election year.
It is likely that the abandonment of NAFTA-style Chapter 11 in the Australian case will have implications for other bilateral, regional and multilateral free trade agreements. Certainly, AUSFTA's unambiguous expression of confidence in national systems of law to protect the rights of investors sets such a high standard that it will be very difficult to justify including NAFTA-style investor-state dispute settlement measures in future free trade agreements between developed countries. While some developing countries may still agree to NAFTA-style provisions in trade agreements with the U.S. if they believe this will increase U.S. investment in their economies, the AUSFTA precedent will make it more difficult for the United States to insist on the inclusion of such mechanisms in future trade agreements with those developing countries who object to NAFTA-style protections, since such insistence could be viewed as a slight against their legal systems.
The AUSFTA example has certainly strengthened the hand of opponents of In international law, direct expropriation by a state-or a 'taking'-is permitted under certain circumstances: if it does not discriminate against the investor, if it is done for a public purpose, and if it is accompanied by full compensation that is 'prompt, adequate and effective.' Indirect expropriation, by contrast, does not involve the deprivation of title to the investment; rather, indirect expropriations are measures designed to affect the profitability of an investment, and thus are the functional equivalent of a 'taking.' Such measures can come in numerous forms, such as legislation, regulations, or zoning.
award aside.
11 The Ethyl case is muddied because three Canadian provinces also objected to the federal measures. The dispute was adjudicated by a panel under the federal-provincial Agreement on Internal Trade. When this panel found against the federal government, it immediately moved to settle the case with Ethyl, paying $13 million in compensation: original documents available online at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/ethyl_archive-en.asp.
